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CHAPTER 6
G. W. F. HEGEL
(1770–1831)
Richard Eldridge

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel lectured on aesthetics in Heidelberg in 1818 and then in
Berlin in 1820–1821, 1823, 1826, and 1828–1829. The text that we know as Hegel’s
Aesthetics was in fact compiled, edited, and published posthumously, in 1835, by the art
historian H. G. Hotho, primarily from the last set of Hegel’s lecture notes, supplemented by
notes taken by students and by Hotho’s own emendations. The earlier lecture notes were
subsequently found and have now been published in German, though the Hotho edition
remains the standard text in Hegel’s official Werke. This edition is the one translated into
English as Hegel’s Aesthetics by T. M. Knox in 1975. It has been argued convincingly by
Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, the most important German scholar of Hegel’s philosophy of
art, that Hotho in preparing his text distorted Hegel’s views, primarily by suppressing
qualifications and revisions and by overemphasizing Hegel’s concern with artistic beauty at
the expense of his actual engagement with the meaningfulness of art (beauty to one side),
especially in modernity. While Gethmann-Siefert has done important work in pointing to the
significance of the earlier lectures, it is also possible to read the standard text with her
warnings in mind and to focus on Hegel’s account of the meaningfulness of modern works of
art as it appears in the text prepared by Hotho.
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1. Hegel as a theorist of modern art
Hegel approaches the philosophy of art as a distinctly modern theorist of the arts. First, he
discusses the major modern, so-called fine arts—architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and
literature (epic, dramatic, and lyric poetry, with brief references to prose fiction)—and not,
for example, gardening, weaving, book illumination, or vase painting. (Hegel of course did
not know film, television, video art, conceptual art, or performance art.) Second, the major
problems about art that Hegel treats are the familiar problems of the significance of art within
modern culture. In contrast with the successes of modern natural science in offering a personindependent representation of the physical world as a system of material substances
undergoing changes according to laws, art traffics in imitations or imaginatively constructed,
often fictive representations that aim at involving an audience imaginatively and emotionally.
In the modern world, art is also no longer firmly embedded in cult, ritual, or religion. Modern
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artists working in any medium are largely free to choose their subject matters and methods of
artistic rendering, without subservience to the needs of religious representation. Hegel
distinguishes between free art (freie Kunst) and subservient art (dienende Kunst) that serves
aims extrinsic to art, as in industrial, technological, or practical arts such as the design of
tools or useful machines. Only the former is the proper subject matter of the philosophy of
art.
Once the making and the reception of works of art are significantly free from either
religious or practical purposes, and once it is clear that artworks represent subject matters for
the sake of imaginative and emotional involvement, it is then all but inevitable to ask what
the point of the practices of making and responding to art is. Is art a serious business or not,
in comparison with, say, either science or religion? Or is it a matter primarily of
entertainment or idle pleasure, so that no failure to know anything or to be committed to
anything attaches to anyone who simply does not care about art? It may be thought that one
likes or does not like certain works as one pleases, and the place of works of architecture,
sculpture, painting, music, and literature in a serious educational curriculum may come to
seem questionable. And if works of art have no serious, extrinsic importance, practical or
cognitive, then how can we tell which things are works of art at all? The piano works of
Mozart, the paintings of Leonardo, and the novels of Goethe are all very different from one
another, not to mention the millions of variations of medium, subject matter, and treatment
found in the productions of more minor or amateur artists. If we cannot regard certain central
works as addressing an important problem of human life in an especially successful way, then
how, if at all, can we speak of works of art as members of a clear and identifiable kind?
Perhaps the word “art” is nothing more than an honorific term that is empty of descriptive
content.
Though he addresses these central questions about the nature and value of modern fine
art, or free art, Hegel’s approach to them is strikingly different from that of many modern
philosophers of art. To begin with, unlike Hutcheson, Hume, and Kant, or in the twentiethcentury Monroe Beardsley, the problems of evaluation and of the justification of judgments
of taste play no role in Hegel’s theory of art. Hegel takes it more or less for granted that there
is a broad consensus, albeit with very rough edges, about what the most central media of art
at various historical times have been and about what the most important achievements within
those media are. It is simply out of the question, for Hegel, that anyone could deny the
distinctive significance for their cultures of Homer’s epics, the Greek sculptures of Phidias
and Praxiteles, the religious paintings of Giotto, Bellini, or Raphael, the music of Bach and
Mozart, or the poetry of Goethe. Undertaking to settle borderline cases exactly by reference
to some postulated procedure for decision is a fool’s errand. What is important for the
philosophy of art is that certain works in certain media at certain historical moments have
been important within their cultures, and the central task of the philosophy of art is to give an
account of this importance.
Second, Hegel locates the significance of art in its role in cultural life in general, not in
relation to the psychological needs of individuals. Unlike Hutcheson, Hume, and Kant, Hegel
treats art as an essentially historical and cultural phenomenon. Rather than talking of the
needs of human individuals, without reference to any historical epoch or culture, for images
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of freedom, for “deep” pleasure, or for metaphysical reassurance, Hegel instead undertakes to
characterize how different forms of art under changing historical and cultural conditions have
satisfied collectively experienced needs in strikingly different ways. While Hegel offers a
general characterization of the task of art as such for all human beings at all times—art is the
sensuous appearance of Absolute Spirit —it is also integral to his view that Spirit develops
itself historically in relation to human life. We may take Absolute Spirit to be, very roughly,
the union of collective, human rational activity at a historical moment with its proper object,
that is, with the forms of social and individual life at a given moment that that rational
activity is essentially devoted to understanding, justifying, and sustaining. Because what
human beings collectively find most worth doing changes historically—both as their
technological situation changes and as their understanding of their own needs and interests
develops (thus affecting their technologies)—what art is concerned to express changes. What
is, for human beings, highest—the forms of life and activity that predominantly solicit and
demand their allegiance—changes, as both social life and the understanding of values
develop from the world of the early Mesopotamian civilizations to the worlds of the
Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and medieval and modern Europeans. As a result, both what is
to be expressed by art and the material media that are appropriate to artistic expression
change and develop as well. Spirit “generates out of itself works of fine art as the first
reconciling middle term between pure [but undeveloped, abstract, and empty] thought and
what is merely external, sensuous, and transient, between nature and finite reality [on the one
hand] and the infinite freedom of conceptual thinking [on the other]” (Hegel 1975, 8), as
human beings seek to determine the appropriate uses of their rational powers to construct a
way of life and to express their determinations in sensuous, material, artistic forms.
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2. Art’s function and the history of art
Given his social, collective, and function-oriented understanding of the nature and task of art
as a historical phenomenon, Hegel proceeds, at once both normatively and descriptively, to
characterize in more detail how specific media of art and how certain central works within
those media have been historically salient in fulfilling art’s function. His treatment is neither
“neutral” and purely descriptive—all philosophical thinking is bound up in the discernment
of functions and values—nor purely prescriptive—it is not the task of philosophy to lay down
rules for art a priori, without regard for how artists have historically discovered what will
work at specific moments to fulfill art’s function. Instead he proceeds, as he puts it,
lemmatically (Hegel 1975, 24), taking for granted art’s function in response to the
development of Spirit, and then picking out various important works and describing in more
detail exactly how they fulfill art’s function in their specific combinations of materials,
forms, and subject matters.
As a result, given both the selectivity of Hegel’s choice of examples and his
extraordinarily broad brush narrative of humanity’s developments, it can seem as though
Hegel’s elucidations of art’s powers are arbitrary and heavy-handed: the product of his own
less than well-founded version of an only semisecularized Christian redemption story and of
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his own haphazard preferences and happenstance encounters with specific works.
Two thoughts, however, can help to moderate this appearance. First, Hegel’s account of
the functions that art serves historically is plausible enough in immediately anthropological
terms, independently of his grand story about humanity’s development. As Hegel poignantly
observes,
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[Man] has the impulse, in whatever is directly given to him, in what is present to him externally, to produce himself
and therein equally to recognize himself. This aim he achieves by altering external things whereon he impresses the
seal of his inner being and in which he now finds again his own characteristics. Man does this in order, as a free
subject, to strip the external world of its inflexible foreignness and to enjoy in the shape of things only an external
realization of himself. Even a child’s first impulse involves this practical alteration of external things; a boy throws
stones into the river and now marvels at the circles drawn in the water as an effect in which he gains an intuition of
something that is his own doing. This need runs through the most diversiform phenomena up to that mode of selfproduction in external things which is present in the work of art. (1975, 31)

The claims that the making of works of art originates in impulses of this kind, that these
impulses then develop as we change in relation to our social forms of life, and that audiences
look to works of art in order to participate in the satisfaction of such impulses afford a
compelling starting point for rooting the production and reception of works of art—
something present in all cultures—in deep, shared, but historically evolving human needs.
Second, by attending to central cases of historically important art, Hegel fills in the
details of his account of the historical development of art in an illuminating way. Throughout
his historical survey, Hegel emphasizes that an understanding of the work—perhaps less than
fully articulated, but nonetheless present within practices of reception—is essential to the
artwork itself. As the expression in sensuous form of what human beings hold to be highest
as a way of life, the artwork is an essentially communicative phenomenon. It articulates—in
sensuous materials—a historically salient sense of what it might be for shared rational
activity to find satisfaction in a way of life. The artwork does this through inviting and
sustaining a variety of responses, including awe, reverence, appropriation in cult, worship,
and “freer” modern, individual audience identification with the artwork as a crystallization of
attention and gesture. Although in modernity, where individuals are freer to choose more
specific and differentiated courses of individual life than were available in more traditional
cultures, there is considerable scope for an individual artist’s choice of subject matter,
materials, and manner of working, and also for variations in individual audience response,
the artwork remains in its essence, or successfully in its central instances, a vehicle of the
articulation, expression, and communication of shared impulses and possibilities of selfrecognition. It is culturally situated and culturally communicative; even where it is
distinctively original, it is not the product of any arbitrary, chthonic, self-standing individual
psychology alone. Combining technical mastery, internalization of the history of
achievements in a medium, and awareness of the shape of rational activity in social life, the
artist must find, more than arbitrarily invent, a way to speak in artistic forms to a historical
present.
Hegel divides the history of art into four distinct phases. Strikingly, these phases are
distinguished from one another primarily by reference to which form of art, given its material
possibilities of expression, is most appropriate to the stage of development and self-
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understanding that rational activity has reached. Though many forms of art exist
simultaneously in many historical moments, only one is centrally suited in any epoch to the
task of Spirit’s sensuous expression.
Hegel finds the beginnings of art as the expression of Spirit within the cults and religious
practices of ancient Persia. The Zoroastrians worshipped light as the absolute source of all
growth and value, but were able to express this understanding only in the most abstract and
indeterminate forms, for example, in towers oriented as sites of religious ritual. The towers of
Babel and Bal in their undifferentiated verticality express unarticulated awe directed at the
sun, while their labor-intensive physical construction for this end unites peoples in the
activity of expression. The lingams and distorted figures of ancient India express a similar
abstract and undeveloped understanding of a natural life force as what is to be revered. In
giving vague, indeterminate expression in sensuous forms to an understanding of what is
sacred, the works of the ancient Persians and Indians stand as forms of pre-art, highlighting
the origins of all art in collective religious impulses.
Art proper begins with the Egyptians, the first people to develop a conception of the
immortality of the soul in relation to the body. In the Colossi of Memnon at Luxor, in the
figures of the Sphinx, and finally in the pyramids as tombs in which the body is preserved for
further life, one finds an essentially abstract understanding of continuing life and its value. In
virtue of the abstract referentiality of these works to continuing life, Hegel dubs this phase of
art Symbolic. Architecture, specifically the building of such abstractly referential works
rather than, say, of dwellings or places of work, is the medium of art naturally suited in its
heavy, space-occupying materiality to this abstract referentiality, and it is the dominant form
of art in its symbolic phase. The transition to the subsequent phase begins when the artificers
of such works become increasingly aware of the significance of their own labors in giving
particularized shapes to the sculptural figures they created, initially as decorations and
supplements to predominantly architectural works, but later as self-standing works on their
own.
The second phase of art proper is the Classical phase of the ancient Greeks. Here the
gods are presented as human figures fully realized in sculpture, the central form of art in its
classical period. In the work of classical Greek sculpture, the god or, later, the hero or athlete
or public figure, is fully sensuously present. Hegel compares the Greek sculpture in its living
presence to a thousand-eyed Argus (1975, 154) that manifests its sensuous meaningfulness to
its audiences in their physical space, as it serves as a focus of worship and of the selfcelebration of the Greek way of life. The understanding of the sacred that is expressed is no
longer abstractly referential. Instead the sensuous presence of the sculpture as a living,
meaningful unity of form and material expresses reverence for Greek achieved humanity.
During this phase, and only during this phase, art is the highest, most adequate form of
expression of the human self-understanding of the sacred.
The third phase of art proper is modern or, in Hegel’s terminology, Romantic art. Greek
self-confidence in the achieved humanity of the male Greek aristocracy broke down under
the pressures of trade and increasing ancient cosmopolitanism. In the Roman form of life,
both citizens and aliens came to live under forms of imperial law governing commercial
transactions. As trade increased, individuals living under Roman rule found themselves
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increasingly forced to draw back from automatic immersion in any givens of social life, in
order to ask themselves: what is expected of me in this transaction and by the law? How
might I as an individual (rather than naturally, as a Greek) regulate my conduct in these
circumstances? Christianity, as a religion of initiation through baptism and conversion, gave
similar prominent expression to a sense of the powers of individuals to shape their courses of
life.
As a result of these developments in socially embodied self-understanding, modern or
Romantic art takes inwardness as its proper subject matter. Inwardness—a sense within the
person of revering or honoring something, which sense is to be expressed continuously in
future action—and its proper objects are now what is highest for us. The artistic media
properly suited to expressing this sense of the importance of inwardness in sensuous forms
are, successively, painting, music, and poetry (lyrical and dramatic literature).
In contrast with sculpture, the flat surface of a painting can show not only a single object
or a local group of objects, but an object, in particular a human figure, in relation to a larger
environment and horizon that might contain anything. Hence a painting can show a human
figure devoted to or thinking about something of importance, preeminently the devotion of
the Madonna to the child and the devotion of Jesus in his suffering to his task. The human
sensuous beauty of Greek sculpture is abandoned in favor of the depiction of inwardness in
relation to its surroundings and objects of devotion. In addition, the painting is made for a
beholder, who must be conscious of his or her position and so of himself or herself as an
individual. Instead of existing as a self-standing object in a public space that it inhabits on its
own, a painting is essentially for a viewer. In many of its central instances, modern painting
determines just one point of view (opposite the vanishing point) as primary for seeing the
significance of what is presented. In the initial phases of the depiction of religious themes in
Renaissance Italy, Giotto and Bellini picked up Byzantine motifs of reverence, but developed
techniques of perspective, coloring, and the rendering of landscapes and multiple figures.
Religious painting reaches its heights of technical accomplishment with Raphael, but begins
soon thereafter to decline into Baroque mannerism as a result of the pursuit of increasingly
dramatic effects oriented toward the painterly surface. A late phase of successful painting
appears in Dutch and Flemish painting of everyday life, as in the Van Eycks and David
Teniers, where the music of colors is used to celebrate and accept modern, domestic,
independent life.
Music develops the expression of inwardness even further, as it abstracts from all
depiction. Its material is vanishing sound, organized into overall plots of “cadenced
interjection” (Hegel 1975, 903) that represent abstractly the plights and possibilities of
subjectivity. By organizing their acoustic material, composers invite audiences to follow and
dwell in patterns of development, involving thematic statement, complication and resistance,
and resolution. In its abstraction from definite depiction, music resembles architecture, but,
unlike architecture, it is a form of art that is generated by and addressed to modern
inwardness.
Poetry combines the temporal development of music with the specific representationality
of painting. It is the universal modern art, the art most adequate to rendering anything in its
significance in relation to human life and feeling. Hegel discusses ancient epic, especially
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Homer, as a precursor to modern poetry, but differing from it in its orientation to collective,
tribal values and to a cruder form of technological life, where inwardness was not of
importance. Dramatic poetry reaches one pinnacle of development with Sophocles and his
depictions of collisions of right with itself, as in the clash in Antigone between Creon’s
insistence on public order and Antigone’s standing on the values of family and piety. Among
modern dramatists, Shakespeare is preeminent in his ability to depict fully individualized,
passionately ambitious, articulate characters whose ego-driven individuality sets them at
odds with their social circumstances, leading often to their tragic downfall, as the rights of
reasonable modern social life must be reasserted, but sometimes to their comic selfovercoming. Modern lyric poetry is able to take into view any subject matter whatsoever,
from daffodils in a field to the French Revolution, with the aim of achieving through the
presentation freedom “not from but in feeling” (Hegel 1975, 1112). Though his treatment of it
is exceedingly brief, Hegel notes that modern fiction, as in Cervantes and Sterne, can develop
the “prose of life” (1975, 1107), in such a way that an attitude of “objective humor” (1975,
609, 1235)—that is, bemused acceptance of the happenstances of life—can be expressed and
cultivated for an audience.
In each of the modern arts of painting (after its initial religious phase), music, and
literature, and preeminently in literature, the task and achievement of modern, Romantic art
is to express imaginative and emotional attentiveness to the particularities of modern life
rather than, as it was with the Greeks, to embody the most adequate understanding of what is
highest. That latter task is now allotted first to religion and then to philosophy. Hence “art,
considered in its highest vocation” as the most adequate form of human self-understanding,
“is and remains for us a thing of the past” (Hegel 1975, 11). We no longer worship art or
worship by means of art; our attitude toward art involves more enjoyment, distantiation, and
critical reflection. But this is neither to say that art disappears nor that it is insignificant for
us. It is instead freed from direct subservience to (often inchoate) religious impulses, so that
it may now explore and reconcile us to quite particular circumstances of life and feeling.
As noted above, it is possible to find Hegel’s metaphysics of Spirit or rational activity—
as essentially aiming at the achievable end of reasonable, freedom-embodying, and satisfying
social life—to be heavy-handed: a last gasp, implausible refiguring of a Christian theodicy.
Hegel seems, moreover, insensitive to the interest of the forms of radical artistic
experimentalism (already discernible in his lifetime in the writings of Jean Paul) that would
lead to modernism and postmodernism. Hegel remains always concerned more with art as a
social phenomenon involving communicativeness than as a form of iconoclasm that resists
social life. But despite these difficulties, Hegel’s ability to organize the histories of the arts
into a single overarching narrative, his connection of that narrative with the development of
social life more broadly, and his detailed insights into the historical saliencies and material
possibilities of meaning of individual forms of art are unmatched by any other philosopher of
art. The works of other, later, function-oriented philosophers of art, art historians, and
theorists of art (such as Gyorgy Lukács, Walter Benjamin, Erwin Panofsky, R. G.
Collingwood, John Dewey, Theodor Adorno, and Arthur Danto) would be inconceivable in
the absence of Hegel’s work, and his specific understanding of art in relation to modern life
can stand comparison with the best of their insights.
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